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Abstract
In this work we introduce malware detection from raw byte se-
quences as a fruitful research area to the larger machine learn-
ing community. Building a neural network for such a problem
presents a number of interesting challenges that have not oc-
curred in tasks such as image processing or NLP. In particu-
lar, we note that detection from raw bytes presents a sequence
problem with over two million time steps and a problem where
batch normalization appear to hinder the learning process. We
present our initial work in building a solution to tackle this
problem, which has linear complexity dependence on the se-
quence length, and allows for interpretable sub-regions of the
binary to be identified. In doing so we will discuss the many
challenges in building a neural network to process data at this
scale, and the methods we used to work around them.
1 Introduction
The detection of malicious software (malware) is an impor-
tant problem in cyber security, especially as more of society
becomes dependent on computing systems. Already, single
incidences of malware can cause millions of dollars in dam-
ages (Anderson et al. 2013). Anti-virus products provide
some protection against malware, but are growing increas-
ingly ineffective for the problem. Current anti-virus technolo-
gies use a signature-based approach, where a signature is a
set of manually crafted rules in an attempt to identify a small
family of malware. These rules are generally specific, and
cannot usually recognize new malware even if it uses the
same functionality. This approach is insufficient as most envi-
ronments will have unique binaries that will have never been
seen before (Li et al. 2017) and millions of new malware
samples are found every day. The limitations of signatures
have been recognized by the anti-virus providers and industry
experts for many years (Spafford 2014). The need to develop
techniques that generalize to new malware would make the
task of malware detection a seemingly perfect fit for machine
learning, though there exist significant challenges.
To build a malware detection system, we must first de-
termine a feature set to use. One intuitive choice is to use
features obtained by monitoring program execution (APIs
called, instructions executed, IP addresses accessed, etc.).
This is referred to as dynamic analysis. While intuitively
appealing, there are many issues with dynamic analysis in
practice. To conduct dynamic analysis, malware must be run
inside a specially instrumented environment, such as a cus-
tomized Virtual Machine (VM), which introduces high com-
putational requirements. Furthermore, in some cases it is pos-
sible for malware to detect when it is being analyzed. When
the malware detects an attempt to analyze it, the malware
can alter its behavior, allowing it to avoid discovery (Raf-
fetseder, Kruegel, and Kirda 2007; Garfinkel et al. 2007;
Carpenter, Liston, and Skoudis 2007). Even when malware
does not exhibit this behavior, the analysis environment may
not reflect the target environment of the malware, creating a
discrepancy between the training data collected and real life
environments (Rossow et al. 2012). While a dynamic analy-
sis component is likely to be an important component for a
long term solution, we avoid it at this time due to its added
complexity.
We instead take a static analysis approach, where we look
at information from the binary program that can be obtained
without running it. In particular, we look at the raw bytes of
the file itself, and build a neural network to determine mali-
ciousness. Neural nets have excelled in learning features from
raw inputs for image (Szegedy et al. 2015), signal (Graves,
Mohamed, and Hinton 2013), and text (Zhang and LeCun
2015) problems. Replicating this success in the malware do-
main may help to simplify the tools used for detecting mal-
ware and improve accuracy. Because malware may frequently
exploit bugs and ignore format specifications, parsing mali-
cious files and using features that require domain knowledge
can require significant and nontrivial effort. Since malware is
written by a real live adversary, such code will also require
maintenance and improvement to adjust to changing behavior
of the malware authors.
Since we desire to learn a system from raw byte inputs,
from which higher level representations will be constructed,
we choose to use a neural network based approach. However,
there exist a number of challenges and differences for this
domain that have not been encountered in other tasks. These
challenges make research in malware detection intrinsically
interesting and relevant from a machine learning perspec-
tive beyond merely introducing these techniques to a novel
domain. For Microsoft Windows Portable Executable (PE)
malware, these challenges include but are not limited to:
1. The bytes in malware can have multiple modalities of in-
formation. The meaning of any particular byte is context
sensitive, and could be encoding human-readable text (e.g.,
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function names from the import table), binary code, arbi-
trary objects such as images (from the resource/data sec-
tions of a binary), and more.
2. The content of a binary exhibits multiple types of spatial
correlation. Code instructions in a function are intrinsically
correlated spatially, but this correlation has discontinuities
from function calls and jump commands. Further, the con-
tents at a function level can be arbitrarily re-arranged if
addresses are properly corrected.
3. Treating each byte as a unit in a sequence, we are dealing
with a sequence classification problem on the order of
two million time steps. To our knowledge, this far exceeds
the length of input to any previous neural network based
sequence classifier.
4. Our problem has multiple levels of concept drift over time.
The applications, build tools, and libraries developers use
will naturally be updated, and alternatives will fall in and
out of favor. This alone causes concept drift. But malware
is written by a real-life adversary, and is often intentionally
adjusted to avoid detection.
Our contributions in this work are the development of the
first, to our knowledge, network architecture that can success-
fully process a raw byte sequence of over two million steps.
Others have attempted this task, but failed to outperform sim-
pler baselines or successfully process the entire file (Ander-
son 2017), in part because the techniques developed for sig-
nal and image processing do not always transfer to this new
domain. We identify the challenges involved in making a net-
work detect malware from raw bytes, and the initial methods
one can employ to successfully train such a model. We show
that this model learns a wider breadth of information types
compared to previous domain-knowledge free approaches to
malware detection. Our work also highlights a failure case
for batch-normalization, which initially rendered our model
unable to learn.
2 Related work
There are two primary themes of past work: the application
of neural networks to ever longer sequences, and the appli-
cation of neural networks to malware detection. The use of
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) has been historically
prevalent in any work involving sequences, but the process-
ing of raw bytes far exceeds the scale attempted in previous
work by orders of magnitude. For malware detection, all of
these previous applications use a significant amount of do-
main knowledge for feature extraction. In contrast, our goal is
to minimize the use of such domain knowledge, and explore
how much of the problem can be solved without specifying
any such information.
2.1 Neural Networks for Long Sequences
Little work has been done on the scale of sequence classi-
fication explored in this work. The closest in terms of pure
sequence length is WaveNet (Oord et al. 2016). WaveNet at-
tempts to advance the state-of-the-art in generative audio by
ignoring previous feature engineering, and instead using the
raw bytes of the audio as the input feature and target. This
results in a sequence problem with 16,000 time steps per sec-
ond of audio. Wide receptive fields for this task (4,800 steps)
were obtained through the use of dilated convolutions (Yu
and Koltun 2016) and by training a very deep architecture.
Ultimately, their work is still on the order of two magnitudes
smaller in sequence length compared to our malware detec-
tion problem.
The use of dilated convolutions to handle sequence length
has become a common trend, as for example in the ByteNet
model for machine translation (Kalchbrenner et al. 2016).
While translation can result in relatively long sequences, their
sequence length is smaller than WaveNet’s audio generation.
While we did explore dilated convolutions in this work, we
did not find them to perform any better or worse than standard
convolutions for our problem. We suspect this is due the
different nature of locality in binaries, that the values in the
“holes” of the dilation are easier to assume or interpolate for
spatially consistent domains like image classification, but are
not obviously interpolated for binary content.
We note another trend when working with long sequences:
the use of RNNs that operate at different frequencies. Mehri
et al. (2017) used such an architecture for audio classification,
but exploited the generative nature of the task to train on sub-
sequences of only 512 time steps. Other works that have made
use of RNNs operating at multiple frequencies have similarly
worked on sequences that do not exceed thousands of time
steps (Koutnik et al. 2014; Neil, Pfeiffer, and Liu 2016).
In addition to the difficulties in dealing with the unusually
long sequences that we confront, we must also contend with
a lack of information flow. When making a benign/malicious
classification of a binary we obtain only one error signal,
which must be used to inform decisions regarding all 2 mil-
lion time steps. In contrast, neural translation models and
autoregressive models such as WaveNet are attempting to
predict not an overall classification, but the next word or byte.
This provides them with frequent label information at each
time step, resulting in a near 1:1 mapping between input size
and labels from which to propagate errors. Such frequent
gradient information is not available for our problem, increas-
ing the learning challenge even before considering sequence
length.
2.2 Neural Networks for Malware Detection
There has been little work thus far in applying neural net-
works to malware detection, and no current work we are
aware of that attempts to do so from the raw bytes of the en-
tire binary. It has recently been demonstrated that fully con-
nected and recurrent networks are able to learn the malware
identification problem when trained on just 300 bytes from
the PE-header of each file (Raff, Sylvester, and Nicholas
2017). Based on the positive results obtained, the current
work extends those results by training networks on entire,
several million byte long executables, and encounters a wide
breadth of potential byte content.
The work of Saxe and Berlin (2015) is closest to ours at
a feature level, as it uses a histogram of byte entropy values
for features. This is in addition to a histogram of ASCII
string lengths, PE imports, and other meta-data that can be
obtained via static analysis. This approach produces some
small level of information from the whole file, but discards
most information about the actual content of the binary in the
process, as it creates a fixed length feature vector to use as
input to the network.
Most recent work in the application of deep learning to
malware detection has used features extracted via dynamic
analysis, where the binary is run in a virtualized environment
to obtain information about its execution. Kolosnjaji et al.
(2016) tackled the related problem of malware family clas-
sification (i.e., which family does a particular malicious file
belong to?) using a combination of convolutions followed
by LSTMs to process the sequence of API calls a malware
file generated under dynamic analysis. This was after down-
selecting to just 60 kernel API calls to track.
Huang and Stokes (2016) performed manual feature en-
gineering of API calls into 114 higher-level concepts, and
combined these API events with input arguments to the origi-
nal function calls as well as tri-grams. Rather than just predict
maliciousness, they performed malware detection and family
classification with the same model (i.e., weights shared be-
tween two tasks). This approach improved the performance
of the model on both tasks, and would be compatible with
our design in this work.
These prior works in malware detection tend to use signifi-
cant manual feature engineering, which requires a significant
if not rare level of domain expertise. Those using dynamic
analysis often rely on sophisticated non-public emulation en-
vironments to mitigate the challenges with dynamic analysis,
which significantly increases the effort to reproduce work.
Our proposed approach eliminates this domain knowledge-
specific code and feature processing, reducing the amount of
specialized code and reducing the barrier to reproduction and
extension.
We note one unfortunate aspect of much of the previ-
ous work in malware detection, including some of our own,
namely, the use of data that is not available to the public, for
various reasons. Data that can be readily obtained by the pub-
lic is often not of a sufficient quality to be usable in practice,
as we will discuss in section 3. This also means we cannot
meaningfully compare accuracy numbers across works, as
different datasets are used with different labeling procedures.
3 Training data
For this work we use the same training and testing data as
in Raff et al. (2016). Specifically, we use the Group B train-
ing data, and Group A & B testing data. Group B data was
provided by an anti-virus industry partner, where both the
benign and malicious programs are meant to be representa-
tive of files seen on real machines. The Group B training
set consists of 400,000 files split evenly between benign and
malicious classes. The testing set has 77,349 files, of which
40,000 are malicious and the remainder are benign.
The Group A data was collected in the same manner as
most work in the malware identification literature (Schultz
et al. 2001; Kolter and Maloof 2006) , which is available
to the public. The benign data (or “goodware”) comes from
a clean installation of Microsoft Windows, with some com-
monly installed applications (e.g., Firefox, Flash, etc) and the
malware comes from the VirusShare corpus (Roberts 2011).
Raw Byte Embedding
1D Conv
1D Conv
σ
⊗ Temporal Max-Pooling
Fully Connected
Softmax
Figure 1. Architecture diagram of MalConv model.
The Group A test set contains 43,967 malicious and 21,854
benign testing files.
It was found that training on the Group A-style data results
in severe overfitting (Raff et al. 2016), learning to recognize
“from Microsoft” instead of “benign”, which does not gener-
alize to new data. That is to say, a model trained on Group A
doesn’t generalize to Group B, but a model trained on Group
B does generalize to Group A. For this reason we only per-
form our experiments with the Group B training data, and
test on both groups. Testing in this manner allows us to better
quantify generalization ability, as the data are from differ-
ent sources. This minimizes shared biases, and gives us a
potential upper and lower-bound on expected accuracy.
We use both group’s test sets, as this allows us to better
judge the generalization ability of the models. Group B’s
test performance is important, as it is supposed to represent
data in the wild, but may have a shared common bias due
to how Group B data was collected. Testing on the Group
A data, which is collected in a different manner, then is a
stronger test of generalization as the data has fewer common
biases with Group B. Because of this, we consider Group A’s
test performance more interesting than Group B’s. We also
want our model to have similar performance on both test sets,
which would indicate the features learned are widely useful.
In addition, reaching out to the original company, we have
obtained a larger training corpus of 2,011,786 binaries, with
1,000,020 benign and 1,011,766 malicious. We use this larger
dataset to show that our new MalConv architecture contin-
ues to improve with increased training data, while the byte
n-gram approach appears to have plateaued in terms of per-
formance.
4 Model Architecture
When designing our model three features were desired: 1)
the ability to scale well with sequence length, 2) the ability
to consider both local and global context while examining
an entire file, and 3) an explanatory ability to aid analysis of
flagged malware. A block diagram of this model, which we
refer to as MalConv, is given in Figure 1, and a more detailed
diagram is in the supplemental material.
Our architectural choices were influenced in large part by
the need to address the high amount of positional variation
present in executable files. At a high level, the contents of a
PE binary can be rearranged in almost any arbitrary ordering.
The only fixed constant is the MS-DOS header, which ends
with a pointer to the beginning of the PE-Header. The PE-
Header can then be anywhere, and parts of it can be located
throughout the file. The PE-Header itself contains pointers
to all other contents of the binary (code, resources, etc). This
allows a macro-reorganization of the byte contents without
ever changing the meaning. Similarly, even within the code
sections of a binary, the definition of functions can be re-
ordered so long as address of sets used in the code are cor-
rectly adjusted. This is another level of spatial restructuring
that can occur. This macro-level reordering represents one
of many types of spatial properties within a binary, but we
consider it to be the most important to tackle. Spatial discon-
tinuities at a function level will remain difficult, but are not
insurmountable for the model to learn around. Correlations
across large ranges will likely be missed; we hope to capture
that information in future work.
To best capture such high level location invariance, we
choose to use a convolution network architecture. Combin-
ing the convolutional activations with a global max-pooling
before going to fully connected layers allows our model to
produce its activation regardless of the location of the de-
tected features. Rather than perform convolutions on the
raw byte values (i.e., using a scaled version of a byte’s
value from 0 to 255), we use an embedding layer to map
each byte to a fixed length (but learned) feature vector.
We avoid the raw byte value as it implies an interpreta-
tion that certain byte values are intrinsically “closer” to
each-other than other byte values, which we know a pri-
ori to be false, as byte value meaning is dependent on con-
text. Training the embedding jointly with the convolution
allows even our shallow network to activate for a wider
breadth of input patterns. This also gives it a degree of ro-
bustness in the face of minor alterations in byte values. Prior
work using byte n-grams lack this quality, as they are de-
pendent on exact byte matches (Kolter and Maloof 2006;
Raff et al. 2016).
We note a number of difficult design choices that had to
be made in developing a neural network architecture for such
long input sequences. One of the primary limitations in prac-
tice was GPU memory consumption in the first convolution
layer. Regardless of convolution size, storing the activations
after the first convolution for forward propagation can easily
lead to out-of-memory errors during back-propagation. We
chose to use large convolutional filters and strides to control
the memory used by activations in these early layers.
Attempts to build deep architectures on such long se-
quences requires aggressive pooling between layers for our
data, which results in lopsided memory use. This makes
model parallelism in frameworks like Tensorflow difficult
to achieve. Instead we chose to create a shallow architec-
ture with a large filter width of 500 bytes combined with an
aggressive stride of 500. This allowed us to better balance
computational workload in a data-parallel manner using Py-
Torch (Paszke, Gross, and Chintala 2016). Our convolutional
architecture uses the gated convolution approach following
Dauphin et al. (2016), with 128 filters.
Regularization A consistent result across tested architec-
tures is a propensity for overfitting. This is not surprising
given the large size of our input feature space (2 million
time steps) from which we must learn the benign/malicious
classification based off a single loss. In particular we note
the difficulty in generalizing from both the Group B training
data to the Group B testing data, as well as the Group B
training data to the Group A test data. In development we
found the DeCov regularization (Cogswell et al. 2016) to
be most helpful, which penalizes correlation between the
hidden state activations at the penultimate layer.
One of the significant challenges in our work was the dis-
covery that batch-normalization was preventing our models
from learning the problem. Batch Normalization has become
a common tool in the deep learning literature for both faster
convergence and a regularizing effect that often improves gen-
eralization (Ioffe and Szegedy 2015). This makes the failure
of batch-norm on our data an interesting and unique result,
which we discuss in subsection 5.3.
4.1 On Failed Architectures
A large number of alternative architecture designs were tested
for this problem, including up to 13 layers of convolution, us-
ing various (Bidirectional) RNNs, and with different attention
models. The MalConv architecture presented performed best
amongst many candidates. We review the other high level
alternative architecture strategies here, the reasons why they
failed to outperform our simpler MalConv, and how these re-
late back to out final design. Additional details can be found
in the appendix.
Adding more layers is possible at the cost of decreased
batch size, due to the aforementioned large memory use
for backpropagation. We tested this with up to 13 layers of
convolutions, and found performance only decreased. Many
of these experiments tried smaller convolutional fields, so that
the total receptive field of a neuron was on the scale of 500 to
1000 time steps. The problem with these approaches, beyond
increasing training time to an untenable degree, is that it is not
possible to due the standard approach of doubling the number
of convolutional filters after each round of pooling to keep
the amount of state per layer roughly equivalent. The state of
the convolutions after 2 million steps is simply too large to
reasonably compute on. Thus a rapid compression of state
size per layer is necessary, but this ends up inhibiting learning.
In our approach we have moved large amounts of information
into the wide filter width in a single convolution, allowing us
to exercise and retain information without exploding memory
use.
Another design choice was in processing the entire file si-
multaneously in one large convolution. An appealing notion
would be to break up the input into chunks of 500 to 10,000
bytes, and process each chunk independently, as this would
greatly reduce the training requirements. We tested this ap-
proach, and while it achieved reasonable accuracies up to
95%, it often failed to generalize to new data — obtaining
test accuracies in the 65-80% range. This is because much of
the contents of a given binary may be fully non-informative
to a maliciousness decision, and training on random chunks
and assuming a malicious label then encourages the model to
overfit to the training data, and memorize the contents to pro-
duce correct decisions. Our MalConv model has access to the
entire file which allows the model to detect the few informa-
tive features regardless of location. This is necessary to avoid
the above variety of overfitting, and is objectively necessary
to work in situations where normally benign programs have
had malware injected into them. In this common situation
most of the file should correctly indicate a benign program,
while only a small fraction of the content is malicious.
The issue of information sparsity is also a factor in our
choice to use temporal max-pooling rather than average-
pooling. Beyond providing better interpretability, max-
pooling also provided superior performance relative to
average-pooling. The latter enforces a prior that informative
features should be widely occurring in the underlying file.
But many features will occur only once in the file, and so
when combined with average-pooling, that feature’s high re-
sponse in one region of the binary will be washed-out by the
remaining majority of the file that produces a low activation.
Max-pooling avoids this problem, while still allowing us to
tackle the variable-length issue.
While RNNs are a common tool for any sequence related
task, we found they reduced test accuracy when applied after
our convolutions, by breaking the output after each convolu-
tion into a number of fixed sized chunks (with the last chunk
containing padding). While an intuitive step to take, this also
imposes a prior into the model that data coming from the
convolution must regularly produce the same activation pat-
terns at fixed frequencies. This is because the input to the
RNN is re-shaping the temporal outputs of the CNN into a
non-temporal matrix multiplication, and thus mandates the
temporal information appear in consistent locations with a
period equal to whatever chunk size was determined. This is
not something the CNN can reasonable learn, and so perfor-
mance is reduced.
5 Results
We now present the results of our neural network model.
To evaluate its performance and effectiveness, we will look
at standard measures of accuracy in subsection 5.1, inves-
tigate the generalization capability of the learned features
in subsection 5.2, and address batch-normalization issues in
subsection 5.3. We will also take a moment to note the com-
putational constraints required to build this model. To get
the model to converge in a timely manner, we had to use a
relatively larger batch size of 256 samples per batch. Due to
the extreme memory use of the architecture, this could not be
performed on a single GPU. We were able to train this model
on the 400k Group B set using data parallelism across the 8
GPUs of a DGX-1 in 16.75 hours per epoch, for 10 epochs,
and using all available GPU memory. Training on the larger
2 million set took one month on the same system.
5.1 Malware classification
In evaluating the predictive performance of our models, we
use Balanced Accuracy (Brodersen et al. 2010) (i.e., accu-
racy weighted so that benign and malicious samples count
evenly) and AUC (Bradley 1997) . We use balanced accu-
racy so that our results across the Group A and Group B tests
sets are directly comparable, as they have differing propor-
tions of benign and malicious samples. AUC is an especially
pertinent metric due to the need to perform malware triage,
where a queue of binaries to look at is created based on a pri-
ority structure (Jang, Brumley, and Venkataraman 2011) . It
is desirable to have the most malicious files ranked highest in
the queue, so that they are identified and quarantined sooner
rather than later. An analyst’s time is expensive, and charac-
terizing a single binary can take in excess of 10 hours (Mo-
haisen and Alrawi 2013). A high AUC score corresponds to
a successful ranking of most malware above most goodware,
making it a directly applicable metric to evaluate. We pay
particular attention to the accuracy on the Group A test set,
as it has the fewest correlations with the Group B training set.
Thus accuracy performance on Group A serves as a stronger
measure of generalization performance. In this vein we are
also interested in which models have the smallest difference
in performance between Groups A and B, which would indi-
cate a model hasn’t overfit to the source distribution.
Despite the difficulty of the task at hand, we found that our
networks tend to converge quickly, after only three epochs
through the training corpus. This is in some ways beneficial,
as the training time per epoch is significant. We believe this
fast convergence may be due in part to the small size of our
architecture, which has (only!) 134,632 trainable parameters.
The accuracy results are shown in Table 1. Our model is
able to achieve high AUCs when trained with and without
regularization, indicating they would be useful for malware
triage to help ranking of work queues.
Looking at the results, we can see our MalConv model is
best or second best in performance on both metrics and test-
sets. It also has the smallest performance difference between
Group A and B test sets, indicating the model is using fea-
tures that generalize well across the distributions. The byte
n-gram model has high accuracy and AUC on the Group B
test set, but the model also has a wide gap between Group A
and B performance, indicating overfitting (Raff et al. 2016).
The byte n-gram model is also fragile to single-byte changes
in the input, which will cause a feature to effectively “dis-
appear” form the model’s consideration. This is important
when we consider that malware is written by an adversary
capable of effecting such changes, making byte n-gramming
a suboptimal approach. Our MalConv architecture does not
have this same issue, and would require considerably more
work to circumvent. Using a model trained on the PE-Header
generalized well to the Group A test data, achieving a slightly
higher accuracy than MalConv, but has significantly reduced
performance on Group B in terms of accuracy and AUC. This
shows some robustness, but indicates the same features aren’t
being used equally across domains. Overall, MalConv pro-
vides the most encouraging balance in performance across
all data and metrics.
The application of DeCov regularization significantly im-
proves the accuracy of the model for both Group A and B
test sets. This is a somewhat unusual property, as it appears
that the DeCov’s primary impact is to improve the calibration
of the decision threshold, rather than the underlying concept
learned by the model. This was a problem noted in Raff,
Sylvester, and Nicholas (2017) for their PE-header network.
Applying DeCov has successfully improved the calibration
of the model’s output probabilities, increasing the accuracy
by up to 4.8 points.
Using a larger corpus of 2 million files, we can also see
that the MalConv model improves its performance, increasing
Table 1. Performance of models on Group A and Group B test sets. Best results in bold, second best in italics.
MalConv MalConv w/o DeCov Byte n-grams PE-Header Network
Test Set Accuracy AUC Accuracy AUC Accuracy AUC Accuracy AUC
Group A 88.1 98.5 83.3 98.4 87.0 98.4 90.8 97.7
Group B 89.6 95.8 86.6 94.3 92.5 97.9 83.7 91.4
Table 2. Performance of models on Group A and Group B test sets,
when using new 2 million training corpus. Best results in bold
MalConv Byte n-grams
Test Set Accuracy AUC Accuracy AUC
Group A 94.0 98.1 82.6 93.4
Group B 90.9 98.2 91.6 97.0
Group A and B accuracy by 5.9 and 1.3 points, and Group
B AUC by 2.4 points. We have also replicated the byte n-
gram model that the original Group B training data used, and
found that performance dropped on the Group A test set by
4.4 points for accuracy and 5.0 points for AUC. Group B
test performance was also reduced, though not significantly.
This highlights the predicted brittleness and propensity for
overfitting of byte n-grams for malware detection (Raff et
al. 2016). Our MalConv network’s improvement with more
data highlights its superiority, and that it has greater capacity
to tackle this problem than prior domain knowledge free
approaches.
5.2 Manual Analysis
Using our architecture design, we are able to perform a mod-
est manual analysis of what the model has learned. We do
this by adapting the approached used by Zhou et al. (2016),
which produces a class activation map (CAM) for each class
in the output. We use a global max-pooling layer in our work,
rather than the average pooling originally proposed. Doing
so produces a naturally sparse activation map which aids in-
terpretability, which we call a sparse-CAM. This is a critical
design choice given the extreme sequence length of our bi-
naries, as it would be impractical to examine all 2 million
bytes. This sparse-CAM design will return one 500 byte re-
gion as “important” for each convolutional filter; since our
model uses 128 filters, there are at most 128 regions marked
for each binary.
This approach enables us to produce CAM mappings for
regions that are indicative of benignness or maliciousness
to the learned network. This preference towards benign or
malicious is determined by the sign of the produced activation
map. Using the PE-file library (Carrera 2007), we can parse
most of our binaries into different regions. These regions
correspond to different portions of the binary format. For
example, there is a PE-Header that specifies the regions of the
file. We expect any approach to learn significant information
from this region, as it is the most structured and accessible
portion of a binary. The PE-Header then identifies which
sections of the binary store the executable code (.text or
CODE sections), global variables (.data), and others. By
determining which region each sparse-CAM occurred in, we
can gain insights about what our model is learning. We show
the results of this applied to 224 (7 mini-batches) randomly
selected binaries from the Group A test set. This allows us to
best evaluate the generalized knowledge of the network, and
the results are shown in Table 3.
Previous work building byte n-gram models on this data
found that byte n-gram’s obtained almost all information
from the PE-Header (Raff et al. 2016). Based on the sparse-
CAM locations, we find that only 58-61% of information
MalConv is using also comes from the PE-Header, indicating
a larger diversity of information types are being used. The
.rsrc section indicates use of the resource directory, where
contents like file icons (but also executable code) may be
stored. Importantly we also see the .text and CODE sections
activating, indicating that our model is using some amount of
executable code as a feature. Similarly, application data found
in .data and .rdata indicates our model may be detecting
common structural patterns between binaries.
We note in particular that the UPX1 section has been in-
dicative of both benign and malicious binaries, as learned by
our network. The UPX1 section indicates the use of pack-
ing, specifically the widely used UPX packer (Oberhumer,
Molnár, and Reiser 1996). Packing will compress or encrypt
most of the binary into a single archive which is extracted at
runtime. This makes simple static analysis difficult, and pack-
ing is prevalent among malware authors to hinder malware
analysis. However, packing alone is not a reliable malware
indicator, as many benign applications are also packed (Guo,
Ferrie, and Chiueh 2008). The prevalence of packing in mali-
cious executables leads to many models learning a direct (but
unhelpful) equivalence between “packed” and “malicious”.
Our results indicate that our model may have avoided such an
association. We hope further advances in interpretable mod-
els will help us to confirm this behavior, and determine which
minute details allow the model to change its inclination.
5.3 The Failure of Batch-Normalization
Our results are seemingly in conflict with what has been re-
ported in numerous other works, since the addition of batch-
normalization to MalConv consistently failed to learn af-
ter several epochs. At best models trained with batch-norm
would obtain 60% training and 50% test accuracies. This phe-
nomena occurred with all architecture design variants. Our
surprise at this result lead us to implement this, and other,
architectures using batch-normalization in PyTorch, Tensor-
flow, Chainer, and Theano. Batch-norm failed to converge or
generalize in all cases.
To diagnose this problem, we started with the fact that
Table 3. Important features as determined by section, as determined by the non-zero regions of the sparse-CAM mapped to the output of PE-file.
Section Total PE-Header .rsrc .text UPX1 CODE .data .rdata .reloc
Malicious 26,232 15,871 3,315 2,878 697 615 669 383 214
Benign 19,290 11,183 2,653 2,414 596 505 423 243 77
batch-normalization assumes that data should be re-fit to a
unit-normal distribution. We then plotted the pre-activation
function response of layers in our network along with that
of the Gaussian distribution, which can be seen in Figure 2.
The figure shows kernel density estimates of the responses
from earlier layers in networks trained on images or on binary
executables. Networks trained on image data display an ap-
proximately Gaussian distribution of activations (smooth and
unimodal), while the activation distribution of our network
exhibits much greater asperity. Since batch normalization as-
sumes the data to be normalized is normally distributed, this
may account for its ineffectiveness in our application. We rec-
ommend that any applications of batch-normalization to new
problems produce similar such visualizations as a method to
diagnose convergence issues.
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Figure 2. KDE plots of the convolution response (pre-ReLU) for
multiple architectures. Red and orange: two layers of ResNet green:
Inception-v4 blue: our network; black dashed: a true Gaussian dis-
tribution for reference.
We hypothesize that batch norm’s ineffectiveness in our
model is a product of training on binary executables. The
majority of contemporary deep learning research, including
batch-normalization, has been done in the image and signal
processing domains, with natural language a close second. In
all of these domains the nature of data is relatively consis-
tent. In contrast, our binary data presents a novel multi-modal
nature of the byte values. The same byte value can have dras-
tically different meaning depending on the location, ranging
from ASCII text, code, structured data, or even images stored
for the icon. Our hypothesis is that this multi-modal nature
produces multiple modes of activation, which then violates
the primary assumptions of batch-normalization, causing de-
graded performance.
Our tests in using models trained on random chunks of
only 500 to 10,000 bytes of the binary support this hypothesis.
When trained on a random sub-region like this, the majority
of bytes will be of a single modality when presented, and thus
present a smoother unimodal activation pattern. This was the
only case where batch-norm was able to reach high training
accuracies above 60% for our data, but still did not gener-
alize to the test data (obtaining only 50% random-guessing
accuracy).
6 Conclusion
In this work we have described the use of neural networks on
the raw bytes of entire executable files. This solution avoids
a number of the issues with the more common byte n-gram
approach, such as brittle features and over-focusing on the
PE-Header as important information. It achieves consistent
generalization across both test sets, despite the challenges of
learning a sequence problem of unprecedented length.
In a broader machine learning context, we have identi-
fied a number of unique learning challenges and discussed
techniques for addressing classification of extremely long
sequences. Our work has extended the application of neural
networks to a domain beyond images, speech, etc. to one with
much more sophisticated spatial correlation behaviors. In do-
ing so, we identify a potential pitfall with the very commonly
used batch-normalization and suggest a way to check if the
technique is appropriate (a normality test of pre-activation
function response).
In future work we hope to further developed architec-
tures that work in this domain, to further explore the batch-
normalization issue, and determine what types of existing
normalization or weight initialization schemes work with
such multi-modal responses. Critical thought must also be
given to ways in which the memory intensive nature of this
problem can be reduced, and what types of architectural de-
signs may allow us to better capture the multiple modes of
information represented in a binary. A general approach to
byte level understanding of programs would have many ap-
plications beyond malware classification such as static per-
formance prediction and automated code generation.
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Appendix
7 Discussion of Alternative Architectures
We have exhausted many GPU compute years experimenting
with various alternative neural network architectures for this
problem, none of which performed as well as the MalConv
approach presented here. It is not feasible to provide a com-
plete discussion or numerical comparison of architectures
tried, but we will give an overview of our experience with
some significant design choices. This section expounds upon
additional details and experiments that could not be included
in subsection 4.1 due to space constraints. Additional refer-
ences are provided to techniques we discuss in this section,
but are not relevant to the discussion of the original paper.
7.1 Architectural Approaches
As mentioned in our primary paper, memory constraints are
the primary bottleneck we must work around to build a model
on such long time series. One straightforward notion to tackle
this problem would be to attempt to train on separate smaller
sub-regions of the input independently. We tried this with
regions of width 500, 1000 and 10,000 and discovered with
this approach that the majority of the binary may be non-
discriminative for this problem because it contains standard
or common code that any application (benign or malicious)
would need. As such the labels for sub-sections were over-
whelmingly noisy as they had to be derived from the global
label for the whole input sequence. These models overfit
strongly to the training data and failed to generalize to the
test data. While applying multiple strong regularizes could
get such models to generalize to some degree (test accura-
cies in the 80% range), they still underperformed compared
to MalConv. In addition, such models had high variability
in training — and on average only one in ten models would
converge to something usable, where most would degrade
to random guessing. We conclude that processing the whole
sequence at once is important to ensure that whatever smaller
features occur that are discriminative can be extracted re-
gardless of location in the sequence. As such we focused our
efforts on shallower architectures with smaller numbers of
filters in the early layers.
This result was supported by another test, where we took
models trained on random regions of the binary, and at in-
ference time, applied them to multiple random regions and
averaged the results. One might hope this would have the ef-
fect of creating an ensemble of models, but in practice had
no impact on the accuracy of our models. This test helped us
to conclude on the importance of having the entire scope of
the binary being a necessary component of our model.
In subsection 4.1, we also discussed breaking up the file
into chunks to be used in a RNN. We clarify the details of
these attempts here. The first attempted strategy was to break
the embedding into N separate adjacent portions after the
embedding, which are then passed to the same convolution
filters (see Figure 3). The figure depicts a simple RNN ar-
chitecture, but this chunking strategy was tried with various
combinations of techniques. In addition, each layer type in
the diagram was tested for multiple depths and sizes. The
figure is only to illustrate the general high level architecture
form.
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Figure 3. “Chunk” strategy where the embedding is split into parts.
Dashed lines indicate outputs that were split into parts. Boxes with
gray backgrounds and the same name indicate weight sharing.
Breaking up the embedding into contiguous chunks was
done in an attempt to exploit model parallelism in Tensorflow,
so that larger sequences of convolutions and filters could be
attempted with each chunk being processed by a single GPU,
thus giving them more memory to support such work.
The above chunking strategy did not perform well. One
issue encountered was that breaking the chunks into many
smaller pieces caused artifacts in the output near the boarders
of each chunk. This was a potential problem in part because
most of our architectures had a receptive field of 500 to 1000
time steps, meaning a non-trivial portion of the chunked
convolution outputs would have significant edge effects at
the borders of each chunk. Since this strategy inherently
produces many chunks, the edge effect is multiplied — thus
negatively impacting performance.
To test how large an impact this had, we moved the “chunk-
ing” past the embeddings and after the convolutions, as shown
in Figure 4. This is somewhat similar to early work in object
detection with CNNs (Girshick 2015). We also hoped that
this would improve throughput with respect to the first chunk-
ing strategy, giving a chance for the GPU kernels to operate
on more data at a time. This performance improvement did
not materialize in a meaningful way, and came at the cost of
forcing the use of only data-parallelism.
Ultimately these chunking strategies did not perform as
well as MalConv, regardless of the method used to combine
the chunks in the end. LSTMs and GRUs were tested to take
the output, using unidirectional and bidirectional variants. In
addition, each variant was tested using both the last RNN’s
hidden state to feed into the final fully connected layers,
simple averaging of the states produced after each timestep,
and the attention mechanism proposed in Raff, Sylvester, and
Nicholas (2017).
Malware “Images” We make note of a particular architec-
tural strategy that is referred to as a malware “image” (Nataraj
et al. 2011a). Such images are generally constructed by treat-
ing each byte of the binary as a gray-scale pixel value, and
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Figure 4. “Chunk” strategy where the convolution is split into parts.
Dashed lines indicate outputs that were split into parts. Boxes with
gray backgrounds and the same name indicate weight sharing.
defining an arbitrary “image width” that is used for all im-
ages. This technique was developed to try and exploit early
image-processing approaches as a way of visualization, and
then for malware family classification (Nataraj et al. 2011b).
This strategy may at first seem intuitive as it would allow one
to leverage existing image-classification techniques, but it
results in a number of problems.
The problems that arise stem from the fact that binaries are
not images, and construing them as such introduces priors
into the model that are objectively false. First, we note that
creating images in this fashion necessitates the selection of
an image width, which becomes a new hyper-parameter in
the problem that must be tuned. Selecting the width then
determines the height based on the number of rows in the
image, for which the last row many not be complete – and
some strategy will be needed to impute the last pixels.
This then leads to the question, how does one handle the
variable number of rows each image will have? The afore-
mentioned work by Anderson (2017) chose the option of
truncating all binaries to only 256 KB, which only partially
resolves the image height problem. This is because there may
be binaries smaller than 256 KB, and it also means the ap-
proach can not process all the raw bytes of an executable.
From an adversarial perspective, the approach can be triv-
ially circumvented by any malware which makes itself large
enough and inserts it’s malicious payload into the end of the
file. Other approaches to dealing with variable height are
equally unsatisfying. For example, one can not meaningfully
re-scale a malware image like one can for a normal image.
Doing so would interpolate pixel values which correspond to
exact byte values, acting on an interpretation that byte values
are numerically meaningful, which is objectively false.
In the context of using modern deep learning architectures
developed for tasks like image-net, we note that the 2D con-
volution of the malware image imposes non-existent gaped
spatial correlations. A visualization of this is given in Fig-
ure 5, where a 2D convolution on a malware image is un-
wrapped to correspond to the original byte-sequence. In this
context is becomes clear that a 2D convolution of a malware
Figure 5. Simple demonstration of the spatio-temporal problem
caused by creating malware “images”. The red dashed area shows
the receptive field of a convolution, mapped from the malware image
form (top) back to the raw byte sequence (bottom).
image is akin to a dilated 1D convolution, where the gaps in
the convolution are determined by the image width, and each
filter processes a contiguous group of “pixels” at a time. As
discussed in the main paper, dilated convolutions were tested
for the MalConv architecture, but had worse performance -
likely because the gaps in the dilation are not meaningfully
inferable like they are for natural images which have strong
spatial consistency. While the given figure shows small gaps
for brevity, we note in practice the gaps will be large. This
imposes a false prior into the model that bytes are correlated
in fixed patterns across large ranges of the binary, which does
not make sense.
For these reasons we do not consider the malware image
approach in this work, and that it is unlikely to produce
satisfying solutions. Indeed, as we have shown, it is little
more than a dilated 1D convolution.
7.2 Architecture Parameters
Initially we attempted to use deeper networks (up to 13 lay-
ers) with narrower convolutional filters (width 3–10), smaller
strides (1–10) and organized into residual blocks. This was
largely motivated by the trends in current deep learning lit-
erature, which has widely converged on smaller filter sizes
stacked depth-wise to produce larger receptive fields and rep-
resentative power (He et al. 2015a; Srivastava, Greff, and
Schmidhuber 2015). This did not translate to our new do-
main, where we found reversing both trends (fewer layers
and wider filters) gave us our initial successes. In order to
facilitate tests of deeper networks in our architecture, we also
attempted freezing the weights of certain layers so that they
would not be trained, thus reducing the amount of activations
that need to be kept to perform back-propagation, and thus,
reduce memory usage. We attempted freezing just the first
few convolutions, every n convolution, and even having a net-
work of purely random convolutions. While able to achieve
high training accuracy, most of these random convolutions
had sub-par test performance (60% or less). While it is not
clear that a shallow approach is intrinsically superior for our
problem, it did outperform the myriad deeper approaches we
implemented.
We desired testing many more architectures, but from a
practical standpoint those which do not perform rapid spa-
tial compression are currently beyond our (not insignificant)
compute capabilities. The large memory footprint of the acti-
vations from the first convolution layers in these cases forced
us to use very small effective batch sizes (4–8 per GPU) and
resulted in impractically slow training without obvious con-
vergence after weeks-to-months of runtime.
Within our experiments with convolutional architectures
we also tried varying the number of filters, but more filters
often led to greater overfitting. In a similar trend, increasing
the size of the embedding space also lead to increased overfit-
ting. We tried dilated convolutions to see if a larger receptive
field was helpful but, again, struggled with overfitting. Un-
gated convolutions led to similar but inferior performance
compared to the MalConv architecture.
We also attempted to replace the convolutional layer in the
MalConv architecture with a quasi-recurrent layer (Bradbury
et al. 2016). Whilst these networks converged they also overfit
and achieved worse validation loss than MalConv.
Some other model regularization variants we tested that
converged but led to worse final validation loss were: tempo-
ral average pooling instead of temporal max-pooling, weight-
norm (Salimans and Kingma 2016) instead of DeCov regu-
larization, Elastic-net regularization, regional dropout on the
input, and gradient noise (Neelakantan et al. 2016). For exper-
iments that used RNNs, we attempted both normal dropout
(Srivastava et al. 2014) and more modern Bayesian dropout
(Gal and Ghahramani 2016).
Our final MalConv architecture used the common ReLU
activation function. We did tests on other activations such
as ELU (Clevert, Unterthiner, and Hochreiter 2016), Leaky
ReLU (Maas, Hannun, and Ng 2013), and PReLU (He et al.
2015b). While not detrimental, we found no positive impact
from their inclusion.
For training the MalConv model, we found SGD with
Nestrov momentum (Bengio, Boulanger-Lewandowski, and
Pascanu 2013) worked best. The initial learning rate was set
to 0.01, the momentum term set to 0.9, and an exponential
decay rate was used. Other update schemes such as Adam
(Kingma and Ba 2015), AdaDelta (Zeiler 2012), and RM-
SProp (Tieleman and Hinton 2012), were all tested. For all
update schemes multiple learning rates and decay rates were
tested, congruent with the recommended ranges for each ap-
proach.
Input (1-2M bytes)
Tokenization (non-trainable lookup table)
MZ\x90\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\xb8\x00...........................\xc5\xff)\xd0~\x90\xc5M\xb1\xfbt8\xac\x0f[\x00\x00\x00\xac
78, 91, 145, 1, 4, 1, 1, 1, 5, 1, 1, 1, 256, 256, 1, 1, 185, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 65, 1, ..........................., 45, 239, 81, 63, 204, 198, 256, 42, 209, 127, 145, 198, 78, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
Zero padding to batch 
max length ~2MB
8-dimensional embedding (trainable lookup table)
1D Convolution
kernel size 500,
stride 500,
128 filters
Integers
Byte string
Gating
Temporal max pooling
128-dim FC layer
Softmax
Figure 6. Full architecture diagram of MalConv model.
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